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Naturalistic Epistemologies
and Normativity
ELISABETH PACHERIE
CNRS – Institut Jean Nicod, Paris
The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in
naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic
epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is
wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at
stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity
from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation
of traditional epistemology, stressing the dimensions of this approach that
may appear problematic to naturalists. In section II, I present and discuss
the naturalist project in its radical form, as personified by Quine, who
questions not only the way in which traditional epistemology proceeds in
order to attain its objectives, but also the validity of these objectives. The
last two sections concentrate on more moderate versions of naturalism.
Section III investigates the various possible roles that may be assigned to
psychology in these moderate forms of naturalism and the ensuing
consequences vis-à-vis the problem of normativity. In section IV, I distinguish
between two levels of normativity in epistemology, what I call the normativity
of means and the normativity of ends and I discuss the prospects of a
naturalization of epistemic ends.
0. Introduction
In the last thirty years or so, the naturalist approach to epistemology has
emerged as an important rival to more traditional ways of pursuing epis-
temological enquiries. However, one should not take the label “naturalis-
tic epistemology” to be referring to a single, well-defined, doctrine. Rather,
this label functions as an umbrella term covering a set of approaches that
question in more or less radical ways the tenets of classical epistemology
and insist on the relevance of empirical research to epistemological inves-
tigations. One central characteristic of traditional epistemology in its vari-
ous guises is that it conceives of epistemological enquiry as a form of
normative enquiry. The main aim of this paper is to investigate what
becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. One should not
expect to find unanimity among naturalists on the issue of normativity.
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Rather, as in other naturalistic ventures, one should expect to find differ-
ent brands of naturalism vis-à-vis normativity, the stronger ones being
eliminative naturalisms, the milder non-reductionist naturalisms, and,
in between the two extremes, varieties of reductionist naturalisms. What
particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity
will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology
and on what level of normativity is at stake. What I will try to offer, then,
is a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from
within naturalistic epistemology. At the same time, I’ll try to indicate
what conditions should obtain for these different attitudes towards norma-
tivity to be vindicated and what I think their prospects are.
In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology,
stressing the dimensions of this approach that may appear problematic to
naturalists. In section II, I present and discuss the naturalist project in
its radical form, as personified by Quine, who questions not only the way
in which traditional epistemology proceeds in order to attain its objec-
tives, but also the validity of these objectives. The last two sections will
concentrate on more moderate versions of naturalism, versions that do
not question the aims of epistemology as traditionally conceived, but only
the means chosen to pursue those ends. Section III will investigate the
various possible roles that may be assigned to psychology in these moder-
ate forms of naturalism and the ensuing consequences vis-à-vis the prob-
lem of normativity. In section IV, I’ll distinguish between two levels of
normativity in epistemology, what I call the normativity of means and
the normativity of ends and I’ll discuss the prospects of a naturalization
of epistemic ends.
1. Traditional epistemology and what might be wrong with it
According to the traditional view, the main aim of epistemological en-
quiry is to determine what knowledge consists in and what makes knowl-
edge possible. Typically, knowledge is viewed as a particular variety of
true belief, namely justified true belief. As Kim [1988] points out, among
the three notions of belief, truth, and justification, the most central for
the epistemologist is that of justification. Although belief and truth may
have an implicit epistemological dimension, belief is first and foremost a
psychological notion and truth a semantic-metaphysical one. Therefore,
epistemology has it as its specific task to provide an analysis of the notion
of justification and to identify the criteria that beliefs must meet in order
to qualify as justified beliefs. Since the concept of justification is funda-
mentally a normative concept, epistemology is at heart a normative disci-
pline. That epistemology is essentially a normative venture can be con-
sidered as the first central tenet of traditional epistemology. Second, tra-
ditional epistemology is also characterized by an important meliorative
dimension: an analysis of the conditions of knowledge should also help us
improve our ways of attaining knowledge. Third, and most evident in the
post-Fregean approaches to epistemological investigations, traditional
epistemology conceives of epistemological enquiry as an a priori form of
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enquiry based on logical or conceptual analysis. Apriority is thus the third
main feature of traditional epistemology. Foundationalism, and in par-
ticular the post-Fregean varieties of foundationalism, can be offered as a
prime example of this traditional approach. It is one of the main concep-
tions of how the traditional epistemological program should be carried
out. It is also the main target of the naturalistic critique. Foundationalism
comprises a variety of specific doctrines. However, all these doctrines share
a conception of the structure of (justified) belief systems. Very sketchily
then, foundationalism draws a distinction between two classes of justi-
fied beliefs: directly justified beliefs and indirectly justified ones. A belief
is indirectly justified if it is justified in virtue of the relations that hold
between it and other beliefs. It is directly justified, if its justification does
not make reference to its relations to other beliefs. The task of the episte-
mologist can therefore be divided into two sub-tasks: (1) to spell out the
conditions that a belief must satisfy in order to be directly justified and
(2) to specify what relations must hold between a given belief and a set of
other beliefs in order for the former to be indirectly justified by the latter.
Versions of foundationalism differ in how they conceive of either direct or
indirect justification. For instance, an important aspect of the classical
debate between rationalists and empiricists concerned the nature of im-
mediate justification. For the rationalists, the notion of immediate justi-
fication was linked to those of indubitability, infallibility or incorrigibil-
ity as borne out by intellectual intuition, whereas for empiricists, imme-
diately justified beliefs were those directly based on sensory experience.
As far as indirect justification is concerned there are also disagreements
among adherents to foundationalism concerning which types of deriva-
tions are permissible.
Proponents of naturalistic approaches to epistemology contend that
the problem of justification as conceived of by foundationalism is insoluble
and hence that the foundationalist project is doomed to failure. They claim
moreover that the foundationalist project is ill-conceived because it is
based on aprioristic presuppositions and that a correct formulation of the
problem of justification requires that these presuppositions be rejected.
One can identify two forms of apriority of the foundationalist strategy.
First, the strategy is aprioristic in the sense that epistemology is con-
ceived as a form of investigation whose method is logical or conceptual
analysis and which can and indeed should proceed independently of any
considerations on how, historically, scientific theorization emerged and
developed. Here apriority involves a refusal to take into account insights
from history of science. Second, the strategy is aprioristic insofar as the
proposed criteria for justification are logical and not psychological crite-
ria. A belief is justified in virtue of its logical properties and/or logical
relations to other beliefs. The psychological aspects of beliefs, in particu-
lar the psychological processes through which they are generated and
sustained, are deemed irrelevant with respect to the problem of justifica-
tion. Different forms of epistemological naturalism emerge depending on
whether their critique of apriority is directed mainly against its anhistorical
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or its apsychological dimension and also on whether they take or not the
collapse of apriority as an indication of the impossibility or pursuing epis-
temology as a normative enquiry.
2. Quine and naturalized epistemology
The main reason put forward by Quine in favour of a naturalization of
epistemology in his famous paper “Epistemology naturalized” is the fail-
ure of the traditional quest for the foundations of knowledge.
Quine distinguishes two parts in the traditional foundationalist prog-
ramme. Conceptual reduction aims at reducing, via definition, the mean-
ing of physical and theoretical terms to the meaning of terms referring to
the phenomenal features of sensory experience. Doctrinal reduction aims
at reducing theoretical and physical truths to truths concerning sensory
experience. According to Quine, we have known, at least since Hume’s
discussion of induction, that the doctrinal part of the programme cannot
be completed. The most modest of generalizations about observable traits
will cover more cases than its utterer will have had occasion to actually
observe. There is simply no way of deriving theory from observation while
transmitting the latter’s certainty intact to the former. Deductive deriva-
tion is not possible and inductive derivation will not preserve certainty as
deduction would. As for conceptual reduction, it is, according to Quine,
made impossible by confirmation holism. Definitional reduction requires
that the meaning of an empirical statement—i.e., from a verificationist
perspective, its conditions of verification—be determinable independently
of the meaning of other statements. But this is precisely what confirma-
tion holism denies, claiming that “our statements about the external world
face the tribunal of experience not individually but only as a corporate
body” ([1951], 107). From this it follows that there is an inescapable inde-
terminacy of the translation of theoretical statements into empirical state-
ments: there will always be several mutually incompatible ways of dis-
tributing empirical content among statements.
Therefore, the failure of the foundationalist programme is not an ac-
cident. It is the consequence of a principled insolubility, related, on the
one hand, to the Humean predicament (induction cannot preserve cer-
tainty) and, on the other hand, to confirmation holism. Given the failure
of the classical epistemological programme, one can either renounce epis-
temology altogether or conceive of the epistemologist’s task in a radically
new way. The second option is the one favoured by Quine:
Epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a clarified status. Epis-
temology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology
and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical
human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally con-
trolled input—certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for in-
stance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description
of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between
the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted
to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology;
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namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one’s
theory of nature transcends any available evidence. (Quine [1969a], 25).
This passage is generally considered as expressing a global rejection of
the traditional epistemological approach, an approach that Quine would
want to see replaced by a psychological approach. Roughly, the repeated
failures of foundationalist attempts are supposed to show, not only that
the way foundationalists were approaching epistemological problems was
inadequate, but also that the problems themselves were ill-posed. Quine’s
proposal would then be to replace traditional epistemology, conceived as
a normative and a priori enquiry, with a naturalized epistemology, con-
ceived as an empirical and descriptive enterprise. This naturalized epis-
temology would still share with traditional epistemology an interest in
elucidating how evidence relates to theory. In contrast to traditional epis-
temology, however, it would not aim at spelling out the criteria these
relations should satisfy in order for the theory to qualify as knowledge,
but to describe the psychological processes that operate in the construc-
tion of theories based on empirical evidence.
Quine’s proposal has met with a number of objections. First, it was
objected that the failure of the foundationalist programme did not justify
a general condemnation of the epistemological enterprise as traditionally
conceived. Kim [1988] for instance suggests that, even though the failure
of the foundational programme is acknowledged, there remain other pos-
sibilities to be explored within the general framework of traditional epis-
temological enquiry:
perhaps, to adopt some sort of “coherentist” strategy, or to require of our basic
beliefs only some sort of “initial credibility”, rather than Cartesian certainty,
or to permit some sort of probabilistic derivation in addition to deductive deri-
vation of nonbasic knowledge, or to consider the use of special rules of evi-
dence, like Chisholm’s “principles of evidence”, or to give up the search for a
derivational process that transmits undiminished certainty in favor of one that
can transmit diminished but still useful degrees of justification ([1988], 40).
One may think, however, that Quine would also want to reject these
variants of the traditional approach. Quine wants to defend an empiri-
cism purged of ill-founded dogmas. Yet, for him, two cardinal tenets of
empiricism remain unassailable. One is that whatever evidence there is
for science is empirical evidence and the other that all inculcation of mean-
ings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. This adherence
to empiricist claims seems difficult to conciliate with the adoption of some
form of coherentist strategy. Yet, the essential point I would like to men-
tion is rather concerned with the deflationary versions of the founda-
tionalist project. These deflationary versions attempt to relax the con-
straints on derivation and are ready to settle for something weaker than
deductive derivation—i.e., derivations that, falling short of preserving
certainty, do at least preserve some degree of credibility to the derived
conclusions. However, such amendments cannot completely avoid Quine’s
criticisms of the foundationalist project. As we have seen, Quine distin-
guishes two main obstacles to the success of this project. One, on the
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doctrinal side, is constituted but the inevitable dilution of certainty the
further away derivations take us from the particular and the observable
towards the general and the theoretical. This is the obstacle that the de-
flationary strategies aim at circumventing. But these strategies are
powerless when confronted to the second obstacle, constituted, on the
conceptual side, by confirmation holism. For, there, the underdeter-
mination of theory by evidence is not confined to the degree of certainty
of the derived propositions, but pertains to the choice among rival sets of
propositions that are mutually incompatible and yet equally supported
by the evidence. It seems to me that this difficulty constitutes for Quine
the main motivation for a replacement of traditional epistemology by natu-
ralized epistemology. What confirmation holism is supposed to show is
that it is in principle impossible to adjudicate certain matters using a
priori criteria. Given two rival sets of propositions, both equally compat-
ible with the available sensory evidence, we have no way to determine a
priori which of the two we should opt for. Traditional epistemology, inso-
far as it sets itself the task of providing a priori criteria allowing us to
decide among theories or sets of beliefs on the basis of their epistemic
merits, meets with a principled limitation in the guise of confirmation
holism. Hence, the necessity for Quine of pursuing epistemology in a new
setting, by giving empirical answers to questions insoluble by a priori
methods.
However, this reorientation advocated by Quine meets with a second
objection: by substituting psychological questions to traditional episte-
mological question, we are not naturalizing epistemology, we are chang-
ing topics. As Kim [1988] stresses, by demanding that we set aside the
normative or prescriptive project of traditional epistemology in favour of
a descriptive investigation of how sensory stimulation leads to the forma-
tion of beliefs about the world, it is the essentially normative notion of
justification that Quine is asking us to repudiate. And since our concept
of knowledge is inseparably tied to that of justification, if justification
drops out of epistemology, knowledge drops out as well. True, Quine at-
tempts to relate traditional and naturalized epistemology by claiming that
both are interested in how evidence relates to theory. But, for Kim, this
presumed similarity is at best superficial. What naturalized epistemology
is actually interested in are the causal-nomological relationships between
physical stimulations of sensory receptors and resulting cognitive out-
put, whereas what traditional epistemology investigates are the eviden-
tial or justificatory relations, hence the normative relations between data
and theory. As a consequence, it is difficult to see what traditional and
naturalized epistemologies could have in common, be it at the level of the
questions raised, of the topics studied, or of the methods employed. Kim’s
conclusion is that the type of investigation proposed by Quine, although
it may well be a perfectly legitimate scientific enterprise, is not a variety
of epistemology. Given their lack of common concerns, it is irrelevant to
ask whether one could replace the other or be a better way of doing what
the other purports to do.
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One may wonder whether Quine is really inviting us to give up any
form of normative epistemological enquiry, whether, in other words, his
naturalistic epistemology should be seen as a brand of eliminativism vis-
à-vis normativity. Certainly, this is the impression he gives in “Episte-
mology Naturalized”. But in more recent writings, he has attempted to
correct this impression: “Naturalization of epistemology does not jetti-
son the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongo-
ing procedures” (Quine [1986], 664).
It may be useful to distinguish here between normativity as linked
with apriority and normativity as linked with a possibility of evaluation
and a meliorative project. There is no doubt that Quine rejects the nor-
mative project of traditional epistemology insofar as this project consists
in spelling out a priori norms of justification for beliefs. But it is less clear
that Quine repudiates the normative dimension of epistemology if what
is meant is that Quine rejects the idea that the epistemic merits of differ-
ent belief-formation processes can be evaluated. Rather he denies that
they can be evaluated without taking into consideration empirical data.
In this respect, the analogy he draws between epistemology and engi-
neering is illuminating: “For me normative epistemology is a branch of
engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, or, in a more cautiously
epistemological term, prediction. Like any technology, it makes free use
of whatever scientific findings may suit its purpose” ([1986], 664-665).
This remark invites the following parallel. The civil engineer in charge
of constructing a bridge or of evaluating different projects for a bridge
must be able to assess the respective merits of alternative solutions and
could not do that unless he had a good knowledge of the laws of (New-
tonian) physics, the properties of different building materials, the geol-
ogy of the construction site, the climatic conditions, and so on. Similarly,
the “epistemic engineer”, looking for the most efficient ways of attaining
knowledge won’t be able to do so unless he takes into account the cogni-
tive capacities of epistemic agents and the conditions in which those ca-
pacities are exercised. If this is what Quine means, the relation of epis-
temology to psychology should be seen as analogous to the relation of civil
engineering to physics. Quine’s original proposal to treat epistemology as
a chapter of psychology should then be taken cum grano salis.
However, even if one considers that the correct interpretation of
Quine’s advocacy of a naturalized epistemology is as a plea in favour of
epistemic engineering, a number of questions remain open. In particular,
one should specify in more detail how one conceives of the connection
between psychology as a descriptive enterprise and epistemology as episte-
mic engineering and one should make explicit the conditions required for
such a connection to hold. One may wonder moreover whether the role
played by normativity in Quine’s project is really innocuous and can be
confined to the assessment of means-end adequation. One may suspect
that there is present in the choice of normative ends—such as truth and
prediction, as suggested by Quine—a normative dimension that would be
irreducible and would transcend the purview of naturalistic explanations.
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We will now turn to these questions and examine the answers offered not
by Quine himself but by “moderate” naturalists, explicitly committed to
preserving a form of normative epistemology.
3. Moderate naturalism and psychology
The reasons put forward by Quine in “Epistemology Naturalized” in favour
of a conversion to psychology are more negative than positive: it is the
failure of the foundationalist programme that leads us to turn to psychol-
ogy. But the philosophers I call moderate naturalists (also called by Kitcher
[1992] “traditional naturalists” and by Kim [1988] “new naturalists”)
adduce in favour of a reintroduction of psychology in epistemology a se-
ries of motivations that bear no direct relations to Hume’s problem or to
confirmation holism. Roughly, moderate naturalists blame traditional
epistemology, and especially Fregean epistemology which they see as the
epitome of this type of approach, for the truncated character of their in-
vestigations. Traditional epistemology is charged with having lost sight
of the fact that the question “How is knowledge possible?” should be seen
as an abbreviation for the question “How is knowledge possible for be-
ings like us in the world as it is?”. As a consequence, the question cannot
be adequately answered unless we take into account (1) the cognitive ca-
pacities and limitations of human cognitive systems and (2) the nature of
the world around us. In the case of justification, the truncated character
of the traditional approach shows up in the fact that it only takes into
account the logical relations between the propositions believed and ne-
glects the psychological and causal relations among beliefs—in particular
all the aspects related to the psychological generation of beliefs—as well
as the causal relationships between mind and world. In short, naturalism
asks that the causal antecedents of beliefs be taken into account. These
causal antecedents can include cognitive events internal to the subjects
as well as events in the external world in which the agent is situated.
Different varieties of naturalism can be distinguished according to whether
they require only that the cognitive antecedents be taken into account or
that all causal antecedents, including those external to the subject, be
taken into account. I shall here mainly concentrate on cognitive and psy-
chological antecedents and on the reasons that motivate considering them.
Kitcher [1992] considers two sets of reasons that explain why psychol-
ogy re-entered epistemology in the 1960s. The first set of reasons, inter-
nal to epistemology, is linked mainly to the tremendous impact made by a
short article by Edmund Gettier [1963]. Gettier offered counter-examples
to the classical analysis of knowledge as justified true belief (where justi-
fication is construed in terms of certain logical relations holding among
propositions believed). Attempts to solve Gettier’s problem have led many
to conclude that the additional requirements needed to fill the gap be-
tween knowledge and justified true beliefs were psychological in kind and
not purely logical. That is, they were requirements on the causal pro-
cesses that generate and sustain beliefs. This gave rise to a powerful ar-
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gument in favour of psychologistic epistemology. Schematically, the ar-
gument takes the following form: for any analysis of knowledge or justifi-
cation in terms of purely logical conditions, it is possible to give a counter-
example where those conditions are satisfied, but the subjects lacks knowl-
edge or justification because the psychological connections between his
states of beliefs have nothing to do with the logical relations. To borrow
an example from Kitcher:
assume that a subject justifiably believes that p, justifiably believes that p o q,
and believes that q. It might seem that the belief that q must be justified be-
cause there is an elementary logical inference to q from propositions that are
justifiably believed. Nonetheless, it is easy to understand that the causes of the
subject’s belief may have nothing to do with this elementary inference, that
she fails to make the inference and believes that q because of some thoroughly
disreputable generative process ([1988], 60).
The second set of reasons that account for the reintroduction of psychol-
ogy in epistemology has to do with the radical changes that occurred within
psychology itself. The 1960s saw the demise of behaviourism and the
emergence of cognitive psychology. Talk of mental processes, psychologi-
cal mechanisms, innate knowledge, and so on, regained legitimacy. De-
tailed empirical models of the operation of these mechanisms and pro-
cesses became available.
To sum up, then, Gettier’s problem paved the way for a naturalistic
approach by suggesting that the epistemologist cannot succeed in his nor-
mative investigation of the conditions for justification and knowledge
unless he takes into account the psychological dimension of cognition.
The development of cognitive psychology, and more generally of cogni-
tive science, provided new insights into psychological mechanisms and
processes that could be exploited by the naturalist epistemologist. The
main characteristics of moderate naturalism are thus the following. First,
as regards the general conception of the proper aim of epistemological
enquiry, moderate naturalism retains the normative and meliorative di-
mension of the traditional approach. It insists however on the fact that it
is human cognition that is at stake. This is well summarised by Kitcher
who claims that for moderate naturalism:
The central problem of epistemology is to understand the epistemic quality of
human cognitive performance, and to specify strategies through whose use
human beings can improve their cognitive states (Kitcher [1988], 74).
Second, as regards the implementation of this epistemological programme,
moderate naturalism insists that the epistemic status of a state depends
on the nature of the psychological processes that generate and sustain it.
It claims therefore, that the epistemologist’s task is to state the condi-
tions that those psychological processes must satisfy in order to yield
knowledge or justified beliefs and to determine which processes do in fact
satisfy those conditions. Finally, it insists that, in stating those condi-
tions, it is essential to take into account the constraints imposed both by
the world as it is and by existing cognitive systems. Reliabilist theories
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are prime instances of this moderate brand of naturalism, since their
main claim is that the epistemic status of a belief is a function of the
reliability of the processes that cause this belief to be formed—where
reliability can be characterized in first approximation as the tendency to
yield a high ratio of true beliefs.1
This general characterization leaves room for important differences
in the appreciation of the exact relevance of psychological work to episte-
mology. In the remainder of this section, I’ll try to pin down more pre-
cisely the exact nature and importance of the psychological contribution
to epistemology. The next section will concentrate on the problem of de-
fining the epistemic ideal and on the nature of the form of normativity
endorsed by moderate naturalists.
We have seen that moderate naturalists claim that justification can be
analysed at least in part in terms of the conditions that must be satisfied
by the psychological processes responsible for generating and sustaining
beliefs. One important question to ask is what role psychological results
can play when trying to formulate these conditions. Is this role merely
negative, insofar as psychological data would only be used to delimit the
range of the possible, that is to delimit what is feasible from the point of
view of human cognition given its limitations? Or can this role be positive
in the sense that we might have reasons to think the psychological pro-
cesses actually involved in the generation of beliefs are epistemically war-
ranted? In short, what is the relationship between our psychological pro-
cesses as they are and as they should be in order to yield justified beliefs?
Psychologism claims that our processes are as they should be. If such
is the case, the epistemologist’s task is to examine descriptions of our
psychological processes in order to extract the properties that these pro-
cesses share in virtue of which they yield justified knowledge. However, if
it is not the case that our actual psychological processes are epistemically
warranted, the relevance of psychology to epistemology will be of a differ-
ent nature. From psychological work on human cognitive processes, the
epistemologist would have to extract constraints on the types of epistemic
requirements he may impose without lapsing into utopia.
Two rather different kinds of arguments have been advanced in favour
of Psychologism: the argument from mutual interpretability and the Dar-
winian argument.
Versions of the argument from mutual interpretability have been given
notably by Davidson [1974], Dennett ([1978], 3-22), Quine ([1960], chap-
ter 2), Harman [1982] and in a weaker form by Kim [1988]. Schemati-
cally, the argument from mutual interpretability claims that it is impos-
sible to give an intentional description of the cognitive states of an other
being without presupposing that the being in question conforms to the
same norms of rationality as we do. Beings who reason in a way different
from ours would be unintelligible to us and thus we would not count
them as rational. In Harman’s version, the argument goes as follows:
1 One of the main advocates of the reliabilist approach is A. I. Goldman. See, for
instance, Goldman [1986] and Goldman [1992].
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We normally assume that there are basic principles of rationality that apply to
all normal human beings ... We come to understand someone else by coming to
appreciate that person’s reasons for his or her beliefs and actions, or by seeing
how that person made a mistake. Someone who reasoned in a fundamentally
different way from the way in which we reason would really and truly be unin-
telligible to us ... In assuming, as we normally do, that we can make sense of
other people, given sufficient information about them, we presuppose that ev-
eryone else operates in accordance with the same basic principles as we do
([1982], 570-571).
Harman’s idea is that since individuals that reasoned in a way different
from ours would be unintelligible to us and hence would not appear ratio-
nal to us, the only rational individuals are ones that reason as we do. In
other words, the way we reason is also the norm of rationality. As noted
by Kornblith [1993b] who discusses this argument, it would have to be
interpreted in quite a strong way in order to serve as an argument for
Psychologism. In order for the epistemologist to be able to pick out di-
rectly the norms of rationality from descriptions of our psychological pro-
cesses, these processes would have to be perfectly uniform across indi-
viduals. Any difference whatsoever in the ways individuals reason would
have to result in mutual uninterpretability. If it was admitted that indi-
viduals can remain intelligible to us despite minor differences in the way
they reason, psychology could certainly describe the different ways in which
individuals reason, but it would give us no clue as to which of these ways
of reasoning is the way one ought to reason. The most common objection
to this type of argument is that it imposes conditions that are much stron-
ger than necessary on the attribution of mental states to others. Stich
[1983], for instance, argues in favour of a condition of cognitive similarity
that allows for degrees and leaves open the possibility of interpretation
despite differences in the reasoning processes.
Another commonly advanced argument in favour of Psychologism is
the Darwinian argument. The most famous formulation of the argument
is that of Quine [1969b], but the argument is also found in the writings of
Dennett [1981], Fodor [1981], Goldman [1986], Lycan [1988], Millikan
[1984], Papineau [1987], and many others. Here’s a short sample, bor-
rowed from Stich [1990]:
Quine: “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but
praiseworthy tendency to die out before reproducing their kind” ([1969b], 66).
Dennett: “Natural selection guarantees that most of an organism’s beliefs will
be true, most of its strategies rational” ([1981], 75).
Fodor: “Darwinian selection guarantees that organisms either know the ele-
ments of logic or become posthumous” ([1981], 121).
Roughly, the idea is that believing truths is more fitness-enhancing than
believing falsehoods: a creature most of whose beliefs are true has a bet-
ter chance to survive and reproduce than a creature that is more error-
prone. Natural selection will therefore favour organisms endowed with
cognitive systems that do a better job at producing truths and avoiding
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falsehoods. The fact that we are not posthumous is thus an indication
that our belief-generating processes do a good job at producing truths.
Here again, the Darwinian argument must be given a very strong read-
ing if it is to support Psychologism. In order to defend the view that the
processes by which we arrive at beliefs just are those by which we ought
to arrive at them, it is necessary to treat natural selection as an optimizer
always choosing the best-designed systems. If natural selection is merely
a satisficer, that will favour well-designed but not necessarily optimally
designed solutions, the epistemologist will not be in a position to argue
that, since they are the product of evolution, our belief-generation pro-
cesses are as they ought to be epistemically.
If natural selection does not guarantee the optimality of our belief-
generation processes, the epistemologist cannot discover the processes by
which we ought to arrive at beliefs by simply studying the processes by
which we actually arrive at beliefs. If it is admitted that natural selection
behaves as a satisficer, the epistemologist may nonetheless hope to draw
insights from the empirical work of psychologists, insofar as it may be
thought that our belief-generation processes accomplish a job that although
not perfect remains satisfactory.
Moreover, one may still object that even if our reasoning processes are
the product of natural selection and hence are if not optimal at least sat-
isfactory, this natural selection took place in an environment—roughly,
that of Palaeolithic times—that has little to do with our present environ-
ment, which is largely the product of our own activities. If it is true that
human beings change their environment at a rhythm that natural selec-
tion cannot follow, nothing guarantees that reasoning processes that were
adapted to the way of life and needs of Palaeolithic hunter-gatherers give
correct results when reasoning about quantum mechanics or medical sta-
tistics. One might therefore claim that the processes selected by natural
selection have a contextual validity, limited to a given domain and that it
would be misguided to try to draw general lessons from them. This does
not mean however that studying them would necessarily be a waste of
time for the epistemologist. One task he can set himself or herself is to
extract the relevant characteristics of the domain for which a given pro-
cess was selected, in order to be in a position to decide for which other
domains, featuring similar characteristics, the process may still be valid.
But there is more radical objection to the use made of the Darwinian
argument in epistemology. The argument, whether given a stronger or a
weaker interpretation, assumes that a higher epistemic virtue—for in-
stance, generating a higher proportion of true beliefs—goes hand in hand
with a higher adaptive value. This assumption is contested by Stich [1990]
who argues that higher epistemic value is not necessarily favoured by
natural selection and that an inferential system that is less reliable may
be preferred to a more reliable one. Stich offers a pair of arguments in
favour of this claim. The first has to do with internal fitness, where inter-
nal fitness is a function of the ratio between cost (the demands made on
the resources of the organism) and benefit (the value of the information
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obtained). It is possible that a more reliable inferential system be so ex-
pensive in terms of time, effort, and cognitive hardware, that the game is
not worth the candle. In other words, the cost may be too high given the
expected epistemic benefit. The upshot is that natural selection might
well select a less reliable inferential system over a more reliable one be-
cause the less reliable one has a higher level of internal fitness. Stich’s
second argument concerns external fitness, i. e. the conduciveness to sur-
vival and successful reproduction of the input-output mapping one ge-
netic program effects. There are two different ways in which an inferen-
tial system might get the wrong answer. He may infer that p is the case
when p is not the case (false positives) or he may infer that p is not the
case when p is the case (false negatives). There are numerous circum-
stances, in which one sort of inferential error may be relatively unimpor-
tant to the organism fitness, while the other sort may be enormously
detrimental. Suppose that in a given environment, a false positive on the
question whether p is relatively cheap for an organism, but that false
negatives are much more costly. It is quite possible that in the absence of
a fully reliable inferential system, natural selection might select a less
reliable system that produces quite a number of false positives but very
few false negatives to a system that is globally more reliable but produces
a higher number of false negatives. In short then, if we cannot rest as-
sured that epistemic virtue is intrinsically fitness enhancing, we have no
reason to believe that natural selection will prefer the cognitive systems
that do a better epistemic job.2
If Stich is right, psychological results cannot serve as a positive source
of inspiration for the epistemologist. The only lessons he may draw from
those results concern the psychological limitations of human cognitive
agents, limitations that function as constraints on the type of epistemic
strategy that the epistemologist may reasonably propose.
4. Epistemic goals, epistemic ends and normativity
We have seen that moderate naturalism retains a meliorative dimension
and sets itself the task of specifying strategies allowing agents to better
achieve their epistemic goals. In this sense, a belief is justified insofar as
it is the outcome of the application of one or several such strategies. But
is that all there is to justification? It might be useful here to draw a rapid
parallel with the problem of the rationality of action. Suppose a student
wants to infuriate her thesis advisor, who happens to be an analytic phi-
losopher, and thinks that the best way to do it is to quote Heidegger and
Derrida at length. One may say that she acts rationally by doing so, inso-
far as the means chosen are likely to be appropriate to the end pursued.
But one may also say that according to a more demanding standard of
rationality, her behavior is irrational because her goal is. It is both irra-
tional and dangerous to infuriate one’s thesis advisor. It seems therefore
that beyond a purely instrumental notion of rationality, concerned solely
2 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Stich [1990], especially chapter III.
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with means-end adequation, there is room for a more substantial notion
of rationality that takes into account the nature and value of the ends
pursued. Similarly, one may think that beyond a purely instrumental
notion of justification, there is room for a notion of justification that takes
into account the nature of the epistemic ends pursued. That is why it is
necessary to ask what those ends are and what grounds them. Moreover,
if the problem of justification extends to epistemic ends, one may wonder
whether the naturalist epistemologist can provide an account of our
epistemic goals. Are our epistemic ends irreducible norms that transcend
the purview of naturalistic enquiry or might those epistemic ideals them-
selves be naturalized?
Until now, I have tacitly assumed that truth was the epistemic ideal
par excellence. It is now time to take a closer look at this assumption.
First, the claim that truth is the ultimate epistemic good is in need of
qualification. As Kitcher [1992] remarks, attainment of truth can be trivial
and there are innumerable questions about the world that have no inter-
est for us (who could be dying to know whether the number of sheep in
New Zealand is now prime or not?). Beside truth other epistemic values
are important for us: explanation, prediction, coherence, a unified vision
of nature, and so on. Even if we set aside those “extra complications” and
settle for truth as the supreme epistemic good, a serious problem remains.
Is our interest in truth totally unrestricted or are we interested in truth
with respect only to a certain class of possible situations? Goldman, him-
self an advocate of truth as the supreme epistemic good, offers a clear
statement of the problem:
Is the rightness of a rule system determined by its truth ratio in the actual
world, and in that world only? Or should the performance of the rule system
also be judged by its performance in other possible worlds? Or is a still differ-
ent performance measure appropriate? Obviously, a given rule system could
perform well in one possible world—say the actual world—and poorly in an-
other. Which possible worlds are relevant to the rightness of a rule system, and
ultimately to the justifiedness of a belief formed in compliance with the sys-
tem? ([1986], 106).
As this passage shows, even if we grant truth a prominent epistemic
value, we need to decide among several possible epistemic ideals: truth in
all possible worlds, truth in the actual world, truth in the world in which
the system operates, truth in a set of possible worlds sharing certain fea-
tures, and so on. Goldman’s [1986] favoured solution corresponds to the
last possibility. He suggests that we take as our epistemic ideal truth in
normal worlds, where normal worlds are defined as the set of possible
worlds consistent with our general beliefs about the actual world.
Whatever epistemic ideal one opts for, there remains to answer the
question what motivates this choice. There are, I think, three broad kinds
of answers and I shall try to characterize the implications of each of them
with respect to the normative status of epistemic enquiry. Goldman ar-
gues in favour of his own choice of epistemic ideal—truth in normal
worlds—by claiming that it is the proposal that best fits our intuitive
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conception of justifiedness. Similarly, a number of philosophers claim that
their conception of the epistemic ideal is the outcome of an analysis of our
epistemic intuitions and ordinary epistemic concepts. But such an an-
swer may not be taken as satisfactory, for one may now ask why we should
grant special value to those intuitions and concepts. A first possible kind
of answer would be to say that, far from being arbitrary, those concepts
reflect a universally shared notion of epistemic good that is for us intrin-
sically valuable. In other words, according to this view, the fact that we
value the epistemic goals revealed by an analysis of our intuitions and
ordinary concepts is both basic and irreducible.
A second possible kind of answer acknowledges that the epistemic ideal
revealed by an analysis of our concepts and intuitions is not necessarily
universal or timeless and may not be intrinsically valuable, but it holds
that this ideal has an instrumental value. Arguments in favour of this
type of answer are typically Darwinian or evolutionary in spirit. They go
somewhat like this: our conception of the epistemic ideal is the outcome
of a long evolutionary process and this ideal was preferred to other alter-
natives because regulating our epistemic behaviour on it was conducive
to survival and reproductive success in members of our species. Variants
of the argument may also appeal to social evolution instead of natural
evolution. In such cases, the reasoning is the following: our epistemic
ideal is a cultural product that evolved under the pressure of social selec-
tion, where social selection favours epistemic ideals that are better adapted
and more useful as instruments towards the satisfaction of other, social,
ends. A third kind of answer considers that our epistemic ideals are his-
torically and culturally variable, but, in contrast to the second answer, it
does not interpret these changes of ideals over times as an indication of
epistemic progress and indeed points out that these successive epistemic
ideals might not even be commensurable. According to this last concep-
tion, the choice of an epistemic ideal is largely pragmatic in character.
Let us now go back to the question of the normativity of epistemology.
We have seen that, insofar as moderate naturalism remained faithful to
the meliorative ideal of traditional epistemology, it kept a normative di-
mension and set itself the task of formulating criteria for assessing the
merits of various cognitive strategies or processes with respect to a given
epistemic ideal. Moderate naturalism is therefore a normative enterprise
in this minimal sense that it sees it as its task to offer norms or criteria
for evaluating the adaptation of epistemic means to epistemic ends. If one
concentrates on this aspect of the naturalist enterprise, its normativity
does not exceed the normativity contained in the task of the civil engi-
neer in charge of evaluating projects for the construction of a bridge. It is
a weak form of normativity insofar as the epistemic criteria that one is
looking for will be stated in naturalist terms, that is in terms of condi-
tions that causal processes must satisfy. But normativity is involved in
another way in the epistemological inquiry and this time the question is
not that of the normativity of epistemic means but of the normativity of
epistemic ends. It is not enough to ask how we ought to proceed in order
314 E. Pacherie, Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity
to achieve our epistemic goals, it is also necessary to decide what epistemic
goals we should set ourselves and why.
The three kinds of answers I sketched above suggest different concep-
tions of the normativity of ends. Suppose, to keep things simple, that in
all three cases truth about nature be taken as the epistemic ideal. To the
question why this ideal, the first answer offered is that truth has an in-
trinsic value, that it is a basic, irreducible, norm. If the naturalist accepts
this answer, he introduces in his naturalized epistemology a form of
normativity much stronger than the normativity afferent to normative
means, since he acknowledges that the ultimate epistemic norm cannot
be specified in non-epistemic terms, that it can neither be defined nor
reduced in naturalistic terms.
Moderate naturalism must then be conceived of as non-reductionist
with respect to normativity or, as Kim [1988] suggests, as a thesis of
strong supervenience: epistemic properties supervene on naturalistic ones.
This thesis of epistemological supervenience holds not that epistemic val-
ues, such as justification, are not reducible to facts, but that they must be
consistent with them. This means (1) that objects that are indiscernible
in regard to fact must be indiscernible in regard to epistemic value and
(2) that certain factual properties of objects must be reasons or grounds
for the attribution of epistemic value and that those reasons or grounds
must be generalizable to some extent, i. e. covered by rules or norms.
(Notice that it is the second clause that makes epistemological superve-
nience a form of strong supervenience.) From this standpoint, what ac-
counts for the specificity of the naturalist project vis-à-vis more tradi-
tional forms of epistemological enquiry, is that it requires that the fac-
tual properties involved in the definitions of rules or norms be psycho-
logical and causal properties.
According to the second kind of answer, although truth (or some other
value) is our epistemic ideal, it is not an end in itself, but a means toward
other ends; in other words, our epistemic ideal has merely instrumental
value. The form of normativity implied by this second answer is thus
weaker than the one implied by the first answer. Insofar as our epistemic
ideal is considered as a means towards other ends, it may be said to con-
stitute a second-order form of normativity of means. Yet, is it really a
harmless form of normativity? This depends on what ends we take it to
be a means for and on the status of those ends. If one accepts a Darwinian
argument to the effect that truth has instrumental value insofar as it
makes a positive contribution to the satisfaction of our ultimate biologi-
cal ends—survival and reproduction—, one opts for a thoroughly natural-
istic reduction of normativity. One takes it that epistemic norms can be
defined in terms of biological norms, the latter being seen as unproblematic
for naturalists. However, for this strategy to work it must be shown that
truth has instrumental value with respect to our biological ends. But, as
Stich’s arguments show, that such a demonstration be forthcoming is far
from obvious.
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If instead of the biological route, one takes the social route and consid-
ers that our epistemic ideal has instrumental value as a means towards
the achievement of our social ends, whether epistemic ends will be natura-
lizable will depend on whether our social ends are. If we can naturalize
our social ends, epistemic ends defined in social terms will also be natu-
ralizable. If it is not possible to naturalize social ends, our epistemic ide-
als will inherit their normativity from the normativity of social ideals. In
the former case, there will be a naturalistic reduction of epistemic ends;
in the latter case, there will simply be a reduction of epistemic normativity
to another, non-epistemic, form of normativity.
Finally, the third answer, that emphasizes the diversity of epistemic
ideals across times, cultures or domains, can give rise to two types of
attitudes. The first interprets this diversity as evidence for the pointless-
ness of a normative enterprise. Given the multiplicity of epistemic ideals
and the absence of meta-epistemic criteria for evaluating those ideals,
the project of a universal normative enterprise is doomed to failure. The
only thing we can still do is describe the epistemic ideals and practices of
a given time and place. From this standpoint, epistemology is normative
only insofar as it attempts to evaluate the conformity of the epistemic
practices of individuals or groups to the epistemic ideals they profess.
The second attitude consists in considering, first, that the plurality of
norms does not exclude their having instrumental value and, second, that
depending on what (non-epistemic) goal one sets oneself, different episte-
mic ideals may constitute more or less efficient instruments. This is for
instance Stich’s [1990] position. He takes it that there is both a plurality
of epistemic ideals and a plurality of intrinsic (non-epistemic) values. The
epistemologist’s task is therefore to examine the consequences of adopt-
ing this or that epistemic ideal with respect to the advancement of such
or such other end. In short, epistemic ideals and strategies are seen as
tools for the attainment of other ends and their value is a function of
their efficacy, with the proviso that depending on the ends pursued dif-
ferent tools may prove more or less appropriate.
If one opts for the latter attitude, the problem of the normativity of
epistemic ideals takes the same form as for the second answer. Epistemic
normativity is not strictly irreducible insofar as it can be defined in terms
of other norms that are seen as the ends for which epistemic norms con-
stitute a means. But the epistemic ideal is fully naturalizable only if these
other norms are. If they are not, an irreducible form of normativity per-
sists, but it is not epistemic in kind.
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